The "Cultural Anchor" of Technology: Why Does Taiichi Ohno's Warning Transcend Time and Space
Thirty years ago, a remark by Taiichi Ohno, the creator of the Toyota Production System (TPS), shattered the illusion of Japanese manufacturing about "direct adoption of American technology." He emphasized that the American technology system was the result nurtured by its cultural soil, industrial ecosystem, and practical experience. If Japan wanted to become stronger through technology, it must first answer the question, "What is our soil?" Now, the protagonist of this remark has changed to China. When we try to break out of the quagmire of "sweatshops" and "overcapacity" and learn from Toyota's lean production, we should also be wary of the "cultural anchor points" of technology. TPS is a product of Japan's post - war resource scarcity, market segmentation, and collectivist culture. If we rigidly imitate it by stripping away these "original conditions," we will only end up with a "soulless shell."
The core logic of Taiichi Ohno has never become outdated: The effectiveness of any production model is built on a deep resonance with local culture, organizational habits, and employees' perceptions. Just as Ford's "mass production" in the United States suited the standardization needs in the early 20th century and Japan's TPS suited the refined market of "multiple varieties and small batches," China's production model must also anchor its own "cultural genes" — we have a larger young workforce, a more complex supply - chain network, and a more rapidly changing consumer market. These are all non - replicable "local variables." Imitation can be a starting point, but "localization transformation" is the key.
The truth of China's manufacturing industry "swimming naked": Four - fold costs of inefficiency and waste
Buffett's famous quotes can always hit the sore spot during an economic downturn: "Only when the tide goes out do you discover who's been swimming naked." In 2005, China's manufacturing industry was experiencing such "pain of swimming naked" ——
The First Pain: The Profit Stranglehold of Overcapacity. The automotive industry is the most typical example: back then, the market demand was less than 6 million vehicles, yet the entire industry's production capacity reached as high as 8 million vehicles, with 2.2 million vehicles of production capacity under construction, and there were also plans to add another 8 million vehicles in the next five years. Behind the 9.18% year - on - year increase in production volume, there was a 36.7% year - on - year decline in profit, and the losses of loss - making enterprises soared by 86.2%. What's even more fatal is the inventory cost: as of September 2005, there were at least 750,000 unsold vehicles in stock. The monthly storage cost per vehicle (including labor, parts wear and tear, and management fees) reached 2,000 - 3,000 yuan. Just in one month, it devoured 1.5 - 2.25 billion yuan — this money could have been used for R & D or equipment upgrading, but it turned into dead assets in the warehouse.
The second kind of pain: The "predatory trap" of resource consumption. The title of "the world's factory" for China's manufacturing industry was obtained in exchange for high energy consumption. In 2004, although China's manufacturing GDP accounted for only 1/30 of the global total, it consumed 50% of the world's cement, 38% of the steel, 35% of the raw coal and 8% of the oil - which means it produced the same amount of value with three times the resources of developed countries. The research by Guo Shuqing, the former director of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, is even more straightforward: The inventory in China accounts for 10% of capital formation (equivalent to 3% of GDP). The accumulated inventory over more than a decade exceeded 2 trillion yuan, and the resulting non - performing bank loans accounted for more than half.
III. The third pain: The cost of the instrumentalization of the labor force. Many enterprises regard cheap labor as their core advantage, but ignore the value of people: Workers receive no systematic training and have no say. When problems arise, they can only execute passively rather than solve them actively. The words of the deputy general manager of an automobile enterprise hit the nail on the head: We treat workers as ‘replaceable parts’ but forget that they are ‘experts in problem - solving’. When the market is bad, unskilled workers cannot help enterprises reduce costs and increase efficiency. Instead, they will all fall into trouble together
The fourth kind of pain: the "sluggishness" in market adaptation. The "inventory disasters" in the home appliance and mobile phone industries are essentially the failure of the "production - based sales" model. In 2005, 20 million mobile phones were unsold in the mobile phone industry, tying up 10 billion yuan in funds. The inventory turnover days of the home appliance industry are nearly twice as long as those of Japanese enterprises. When market demand has shifted from "standardization" to "personalization", our production model still remains in the era of "mass manufacturing".
Toyota's "Counter-cyclical Code": Why Can TPS "Survive the Cold Winter"
While Chinese enterprises were struggling with inventory and losses, Toyota achieved "reverse growth" during the economic downturn: it sold 8.09 million vehicles globally in 2005, and planned to increase production to 9.06 million vehicles in 2006, dethroning General Motors from the "world's No. 1" position; its net profit in 2004 was 10.2 billion US dollars, exceeding the total of the three major US automakers (General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler); its net profit reached a new high of 10.4 billion US dollars in 2005, while General Motors suffered losses of over 3.7 billion US dollars in the first three quarters of that year.
The "invincibility" of Toyota stems from the underlying logic of "anti-waste" in TPS. It is not just a set of tools but a philosophy of "redefining production".
Pull production: Reverse the process from the end - consumer demand back to the suppliers to completely eliminate the waste of "overproduction" (Toyota's inventory turnover days are only 15 days, while the average for Chinese enterprises exceeds 60 days).
Continuous improvement (Kaizen): Front-line workers have the right to stop the production line to solve problems. They put forward 2 million improvement suggestions each year, and more than 90% of them are adopted. This "bottom-up" optimization enables the production efficiency to increase by 5%-10% annually.
Respect employees: Regard workers as "assets of the enterprise" rather than "costs" - Toyota's training system covers all employees. Front-line workers can participate in the design of production processes and even lead technological improvements.
High-quality built-in: Use "Jidoka" to enable equipment to automatically stop when an abnormality occurs, preventing defective products from flowing into the next process and reducing rework waste (Toyota's defective product rate is only 0.01%, which is 1/10 of the industry average).
These logics together form Toyota's "risk-resistant barrier": when the economy is good, it can quickly respond to demand; when the economy is bad, it can maintain profits by reducing costs and improving efficiency - this is the "counter-cyclical ability" of TPS.
The awakening of Chinese enterprises: From "imitating forms" to "growing from the essence"
The history of Chinese enterprises learning TPS is earlier than that of American enterprises. More than 20 years ago, some enterprises introduced tools such as kanban management and 5S. However, the result is that they only resemble TPS in form but not in essence.
- After learning about "kanban management", but without establishing a "production on demand" mechanism, production is still carried out in large quantities according to the plan, and inventory remains high.
- After learning about the "5S Management", the company failed to cultivate a culture where employees proactively maintain the environment, and it ultimately became a "formality to cope with inspections".
- Having learned about "continuous improvement" but without empowering employees, front-line workers still "just do their jobs without speaking up", and improvement suggestions are left untouched.
The bitter complaint of a deputy general manager of an automobile enterprise has exposed the "imitation trap": "When we learned TPS, we learned 'how to arrange the kanban' and 'how to organize the tools', but we didn't learn 'why we should do so'. The core of TPS is 'eliminating waste' and'respecting people', and what we learned was just the 'trimmings'. Now that the market is in a slump, the inventory piles up and can't be sold. We're making a loss on every car produced. I'd rather jump off a building than go back to the old way of 'production - led sales'!"
The cost of this "form imitation" is the "collective inefficiency" of the entire industry. When the "cost constraint" of the market becomes tighter and tighter, and when the "dividends" of resources and labor disappear, Chinese enterprises finally realize that without a localized production model, no matter how advanced the tools are, they cannot save the inefficiency.
The path to CPS: Creating a production model with "Chinese characteristics"
Toyota's success has never been about "copying the American model" but "creating the Japanese model." Similarly, China's future lies not in "copying TPS" but in "creating CPS (China Production System)."
The core of CPS is to anchor China's "local genes" — it must address the "specific problems" of Chinese enterprises rather than simply copy Japan's "abstract logic".
"Flexible collaboration" in the supply chain: China's supply chain is more complex with significant regional differences. CPS needs to connect suppliers, factories, and distributors through a digital platform to achieve "real-time demand transmission and real-time production adjustment". For example, a household appliance enterprise reduced its inventory turnover days from 60 days to 25 days through a digital supply chain.
"Skill upgrade" of the labor force: The labor force in China is younger and more willing to learn. CPS needs to establish a "skill training system". For example, a certain automobile enterprise links "continuous improvement" with employee promotion. The improvement suggestions from front - line workers save the enterprise over ten million yuan every year.
"Rapid response" of the market: The consumer market in China changes more rapidly. CPS requires the production capacity of "small batches and multiple varieties". For example, a mobile phone enterprise can achieve "switching product models within 1 hour" through a flexible production line to meet personalized needs.
The "collective wisdom" of culture: Chinese culture emphasizes "collectivism", and CPS can take "team improvement" as the core. For example, a manufacturing enterprise takes work teams as units to jointly solve problems in production, and the efficiency of the work teams has increased by 30%.
These "local practices" are the "growing soil" for CPS. Just as Taiichi Ohno "grew" TPS from the Toyota workshop back then, China's CPS must also "grow" from the "problem sites" of Chinese enterprises. It is not learned from books, but created bit by bit in the process of solving problems such as "excessively high inventory", "extremely low efficiency", and "workers having no say".
Conclusion: The leap from "imitator" to "creator"
Ohno Taiichi once said, "TPS was not created by me. It was created by all the workers at Toyota together." This statement also applies to CPS. It is not an "invention" of an individual but the result of the joint exploration by Chinese enterprises, employees, and the market.
The future of China's manufacturing industry lies not in "copying Japan" but in "creating China." When we put aside the mentality of "copying others' work" and start to extract experiences from "the problem sites," draw wisdom from "frontline workers," and find directions from "market demands" - at that time, CPS will, just like TPS, become the "core competitiveness" of China's manufacturing industry.
This is not an easy path, but it is the only way. Because truly powerful production models are always "endogenous," not "borrowed from outside." As Taiichi Ohno said, "The essence of a production model is the symbiosis of 'people' and 'processes.' Without 'human participation,' even the most advanced processes cannot be implemented."
The "breakthrough" of China's manufacturing industry starts with respecting "people", starts with solving "specific problems", and starts with "creating its own model".
Xu Chun, awakened by two questions: Brilliance's 8-year detour in emulating Toyota and the reflections
In the early winter of 2005 in Shenyang, in the shabby and old office building of Brilliance Jinbei at No. 14, Shanzuizi Road, the drizzle drifted in along with the rumbling of the machines in the workshop. Xu Chun, 32 years old, was sitting in front of the conference table, with eight years' worth of lean production project data spread out in front of him. As the person in charge of the company's industrial engineering department, he had just been left speechless by two questions from President Liu Zhigang: "We've been learning from Toyota since 1993. After eight years, what on earth have we gained? Why should the project you're promoting be implemented?"
Xu Chun is not an outsider: He graduated from the Forging and Pressing major at Jinzhou Institute of Technology. He joined Brilliance in 1996 and learned from Japanese experts for nine years. In 2003, he integrated the industrial engineering departments of the Haishi and Zhonghua branch factories and led 11 young people with an average age of 28 as a "Lean evangelist". However, the question that day hit the most painful sore spot of Brilliance's attempt to learn from Toyota - in eight years, they only copied the "appearance" without grasping the "essence".
Early "tracing" learning: Just follow the drawings without ever asking "why"
Huachen started to get in touch with the Toyota Production System (TPS) relatively early: It signed a technical assistance contract in 1988, and in 1992, it was clearly stated in "Appendix B-1" that it would learn "production management and logistics management". However, right from the start, it was the Japanese experts who drew the blueprints and the Chinese employees who simply copied them
- How about the production line layout? The equipment is arranged according to the lines drawn by Japanese experts, with even the positions of the screw holes exactly the same.
- Equipment maintenance? Replace the molds according to the schedule set by Japanese experts, even if the molds can still be used.
- How do the workers operate? They learn the movement of "bending the wrist by 30 degrees" from Japanese experts and even imitate the breathing rhythm.
From senior executives to front-line workers, no one has ever asked, "Why should it be arranged like this?", "Why at this time?", or "Why bend at a 30-degree angle?" Everyone assumes by default that "Toyota can make money by doing this, so we just need to follow suit."
Xu Chun said that at that time, their understanding of "lean" was simply to "copy Toyota's tools": Since Toyota used kanban, they also made a batch and hung them on the production line; since Toyota used the "Andon" system, they also installed red - light buttons. But how to calculate the numbers on the kanban? Who should come to repair when the Andon lights up? No one thought about it. As a result, the kanban became "ornaments" and the Andon system became "decorations". The production line still stopped when it should, and defective products still piled up as before.
Reflection after being stumped: Lean is not a "numbers game," but about "solving real problems."
Liu Zhigang's question was like a bucket of cold water, forcing Xu Chun to look back on the accounts of the past eight years. This review uncovered three "fatal misunderstandings":
Myth 1: Inventory management is not about "lowering the numbers" but "improving efficiency"
Previously, they regarded "inventory reduction" as a "KPI". For example, they compulsorily required the raw material inventory to be reduced from 10 days to 5 days. As a result, the production line often stopped due to a shortage of parts. Workers waited for the materials to arrive, and the machines ran idle. To rush to fulfill orders, they had to find logistics companies for expedited transportation. The freight alone was 20% more than the inventory cost saved.
"This is not lean; it's 'anti-lean'!" Xu Chun said. "The core of lean is to 'eliminate waste', but what we've done is'save money on inventory while wasting money on machines and labor'."
Later they finally understood that inventory is a "result", not a "goal". True lean management means streamlining the process first. For example, originally 10 workers could produce 100 cars. After optimization using lean methods, 10 workers can produce 120 cars. Only then can reducing inventory truly save costs. "It's like running a marathon. You have to build up your physical strength first and then learn skills. If you force yourself to speed up without building up your physical strength, you'll only fall."
Myth 2: "One-piece flow" is not a "conveyor belt", but "connecting processes and solving problems"
What's even worse is the misunderstanding of "One Piece Flow". Originally, the technicians at Brilliance thought that "One Piece Flow" meant "buying a conveyor belt to transfer parts from the first workstation to the last one". As a result, after installing the conveyor belt, problems such as "the previous workstation works too fast and parts pile up at the next workstation" and "100 pieces have been made when defective products are discovered" emerged.
It wasn't until the Japanese experts came that they pointed at the parts piled on the ground and said, "You've got it wrong! 'One-piece flow' means connecting the separated processes. After one workstation finishes its work, it directly passes the work - piece to the next workstation, and there's no place for piling up materials in between. As a result: "
- If a defective product is produced at the previous workstation, the next workstation can immediately detect it, call someone to repair it on the spot, and prevent the defective product from flowing downstream.
- If the subsequent workstation works slowly, the preceding workstation has to wait, which forces the preceding workstation to optimize its process
Xu Chun gave an example: Previously, the "welding - painting" process in the sea lion workshop was separated. The welded car bodies had to be stored in the warehouse and then transported to the painting workshop, with a storage period of 2 days in between. Later, it was changed to a "one - piece flow" system, connecting the end of the welding line with the beginning of the painting line. As soon as the car body was welded, it entered the painting line. As a result, problems were found on the first day: the mold at the welding station was crooked, and it was exposed after painting on the painting line. The workers immediately called the welding team leader to come and repair it, and the mold was adjusted on the same day. If it had been the previous way with a 2 - day storage period, by the time the problem was discovered, 200 crooked car bodies had already been welded and all of them would have to be reworked. This is exactly what "quality is built in production, not inspected out" means.
Myth 3: Chinese lean management must be "tailored to the local context"
There is also an unavoidable issue: China's cost structure is different from that of Japan.
In Japan, labor costs account for 20% of the total cost. So, replacing 5 workers with robots can save a lot of money. For example, a robot costs 1 million yuan. Replacing 5 workers, with each Japanese worker having an annual salary of 300,000 yuan, the total annual salary for 5 workers is 1.5 million yuan. The investment can be recouped in two years. However, in China, labor costs only account for 2.6%. The total annual salary for 5 workers is only 180,000 yuan, while a robot costs 500,000 yuan. It takes nearly 3 years to recoup the investment, and the service life of a robot is only 5 years. Using robots in China is not about "saving labor" but "wasting resources".
Xu Chun said that they had also tried to replace workers with robots before. As a result, "the money spent on buying robots was more than the saved wages", so they quickly stopped it. "Lean is not 'copying Japan', but 'fitting China's reality' —— it's 'lean' for Japan to use robots, but 'anti - lean' for us to do so."
Lean management today: From "copying tools" to "learning the philosophy"
Now Xu Chun is promoting lean management. Instead of focusing on "how much inventory to reduce" or "how many andons to install", he first explains to the workers "why we need to implement lean management".
- Tell the workers in the welding workshop, "Connecting the processes doesn't mean making you more tired. It's to save you from reworking the defective products that have been piling up in the warehouse."
- Tell the workers in the painting workshop, "Solve the problems on the spot. It's not about making you take the blame. It's about making you become 'problem solvers', and you'll get a pay raise in the future."
Now, the workers at Brilliance Auto will actively call the team leader when they see the Andon light on. When they see the previous workstation working too fast, they will say, "Wait a minute. I haven't finished yet." — They are no longer just "executors," but "problem solvers."
The essence of lean: It's not "copying Toyota", but "solving problems with ideas"
A senior executive at Toyota China once said, "When Chinese enterprises learn lean management, they often make the mistake of 'buying the casket and returning the pearl' – taking the tools as the end and forgetting the underlying philosophy."
Xu Chun now understands that the essence of lean is to "eliminate all waste". Toyota's "jidoka" (automation with a "human" radical, enabling machines to stop the production line and workers to solve problems), "just-in-time" (JIT), and "standardized work" are all aimed at this goal. Meanwhile, kanban, andon, and production management boards are merely "tools" to achieve the goal.
As he said, "Previously, when we learned from Toyota, we 'followed the path'; now, we 'think our way forward' - Lean is not about 'copying Toyota', but 'using Toyota's thinking to solve Brilliance's problems'."
At the end of the interview, Xu Chun pointed at the workshop outside the window and said, "Look at the current production line. There are no mountains of parts, and workers will actively call for help when they encounter problems. This is the so - called'real lean manufacturing'. It's not that we are imitating Toyota. Instead, we are using Toyota's ideas to implement 'Brilliance's lean manufacturing'."